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Indeed, that man Luther is the master of us all.
—Søren Kierkegaard1
Introduction
Classical American pragmatism is an estimable source to understand religion 
as an inescapable human endeavor. Despite logical divergences among the ap-
proaches of classical figures, they share a primeval interest in religion. Charles 
Sanders Peirce, for example, gave religion a central role in his philosophy, 
especially through his conception of evolutionary love; Josiah Royce linked 
religion and morality in an attempt to assert the vitality of the idealist tradi-
tion. Finally, John Dewey fought “militant atheism” through a vision that 
could be called religious naturalism. As part of the core of this movement, 
William James’s philosophy has religion as a fundamental issue too.
 Numerous books and articles have already been written on James’s views 
on religious experiences and religion. Thus, it is not my purpose to repeat or 
rephrase either James or the literature, but to explore a couple of neglected 
connections: the line that can be drawn between Luther and James, on the 
one hand; and on the other hand, the role that Hegel’s conception of reli-
gion could play in relation to Luther and James. Accordingly, I will support 
the view that inwardness is one of the foremost ways to understand the links 
between these thinkers.
 Given this general framework, one of the main issues relates to institutional 
creeds, particularly to the role of the Protestant spirit and denominations in 
classical American philosophy. As regards James, he tends to oscillate between 
identifying his writings as belonging to the general spirit of Protestantism, on 
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the one hand, and as referring to religious experiences beyond the Protestant 
framework, on the other.2 The first tendency clearly appears in several parts of 
James’s work.3 The literature has also reflected this dualistic viewpoint. David 
Hollinger, for example, points out that James unequivocally belongs to the 
Protestant tradition.4 Meanwhile, the second tendency can be found in James’s 
definition of religion at the beginning of The Varieties of Religious Experience:
Religion, therefore, as I now ask you arbitrarily to take it, shall mean for 
us the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so 
far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may 
consider the divine. (34; emphasis in original)
 Some outstanding interpreters of James’s work, such as Ralph Barton 
Perry and Henry Levinson, emphasize that these kinds of statements grasp 
the core of the Jamesian point of view on religion.5 Consequently, in the 
circumscription of this topic, James would ground his conception of religion 
in the psychology of religious experiences and not in a particular theology, 
doctrine, or sectarian view.
 My position in this paper, despite this Jamesian circumscription of the 
topic, is that there are several Protestant issues within James’s works, and 
especially in Varieties.6 Those aspects seem to refer mainly to Calvinism (in 
their different versions), which appears to be the skeleton of Varieties (see 
Hollinger; Levinson 15). Besides, Calvinism could be interpreted as a bio-
graphical source of James’s religious tendencies. As Gerald Myers writes:
Biographers have conjectured about the source of James’s [religious] 
need. It may have resulted from the strict Presbyterianism of his powerful 
and wealthy grandfather, the elder William James, or from his father’s 
rebellious, freethinking bouts with Calvinism, other influences may have 
been the piety of his mother, his early reading of Jonathan Edwards, and 
his study of the Great Awakening in American history. (256)
 From Myers’s words, we could infer that, despite the numerous sources 
used in Varieties, only the Protestant ones are essential to understand James’s 
religious outlook. Meanwhile, within the literature, some authors relate James 
to the two fundamental branches of Protestantism: Calvinism and Lutheran-
ism. Amanda Porterfield, for instance, refers to the dual Protestant character 
in James’s viewpoint: Luther’s conception of faith as an essential feature of 
religion, on the one hand, and Calvin’s idea of moral strenuousness empow-
ering religious believers, on the other (147).
 Besides Porterfield, three authors—to the best of my knowledge—have 
stressed the relevance of Luther’s influence in James’s religious thought. One 
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of them was David Zehnder, who relates James to Lutheran Reformation 
(301). He points out one aspect of James’s conception of religion (i.e., self-
surrender), which will be widely referred to in the corpus of this paper.7 
Meanwhile, William Spohn wrote an insightful interpretation of James’s 
religious thought:
A particular narrative of Christianity had already determined the shape 
of redemption that he assumed to be nonsectarian. He [James] ex-
trapolated a common pattern from his sources, but they were mostly 
Protestant and almost exclusively Christian. In the Varieties he relied 
heavily on the conversions studied by Edwin Diller Starbuck. They were 
taken primarily from Western sources and interpreted through conven-
tional theological frameworks, particularly the paradigm of justification 
through faith articulated by Reformation Christianity. Martin Luther 
defined Christian conversion according to Augustine’s reading of Paul’s 
conversion experience. Romans and Galatians in effect are interpreted 
through the story of Augustine’s Confessions. (32)8
 Spohn clearly remarks upon something that is essential to the interpre-
tation I present in this article: at the core of Varieties, there is a particularly 
Protestant—more specifically, Lutheran—way to understand religious experi-
ence. The third author who relates James with Luther was Paul Hinlicky. He 
offers a sharp interpretation of Luther’s dual influence on James’s thought: 
Luther’s conception of religion should be considered, on the one hand, as 
belonging to the healthy mentality, especially through his doctrine of jus-
tification by faith; and on the other hand, it should also be interpreted as 
exemplifying the religion of sick souls. But how can this duality be explained? 
Hinlicky points to Luther’s view of “enthusiasm” as the most relevant element 
in religion (Hinlicky 25), as the key to the understanding of this duality. 
Beyond creeds and rites, there exists an inescapable fundamental closeness 
in the relationship between the individual and God. In my interpretation 
of Hinlicky, Luther’s conception of religion would be for James either the 
relationship of enthusiastic hope of the healthy mentality, (the ecstatic self-
surrender) or the trembling despair of sick souls.9 I think that this is one 
of the reasons why Luther is the paradigmatic model of religious genius in 
Varieties. I will return to this issue in the corpus of the article. Summing up, 
there seems to be at least four approaches to understanding James’s thought 
on religion: in the first place, interpreters who point out the nonsectarian 
and non-institutional character of James’s religious conception as its more 
important aspect (e.g., James’s circumscription of the topic and conclusion in s__
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Varieties; Perry; Levinson; see also note 5); secondly, authors who think that 
James’s conception of religion should be understood as a form of inherited 
and diluted Calvinism, which belongs to the liberal Protestant tradition and 
emphasizes the moral strenuousness that religion gives us (especially Porter-
field; Hollinger); thirdly, those who appeal to the influence of Swedenborg’s 
heterodox theology through the writings and influence of Henry James, Sr. 
(Croce; Habegger); and finally, authors who think that one of the most im-
portant sources to understand James’s religious thought is Martin Luther’s 
Protestantism (Zehnder; Spohn).
 My article clearly belongs to the fourth interpretative approach. I attempt 
to focus on one aspect of James’s thought, namely its link with Luther and 
Lutheranism, which is examined from both a narrow and a comprehensive 
perspective. The former refers to the role played by Luther’s conceptions of 
religion within James’s work—specifically in Varieties. The latter deals with 
Luther’s thought and the development of Lutheranism from its origin, and 
the role that James’s conception could play in connection with it.
 Grounded on those perspectives, I defend three hypotheses in this work: 
first, that James’s conception of religion is markedly influenced by Luther’s 
thought in central parts of Varieties; second, that the Lutheran core of James’s 
view lies in the split he makes between religion and morality, on the one 
hand, and in the distinction between the content of faith and having faith, on 
the other hand; third, that James’s conception of religion is one of the most 
radical representatives of a philosophical way to interpret Luther’s thought: 
the primacy of Luther’s conception of faith against Luther’s idea of Church 
and sola scriptura—a comprehensive perspective integrating James’s Varieties 
into the philosophical reception of Lutheranism.10
I. Luther and Lutheranism
It is well known that at the turn of the sixteenth century, Martin Luther trig-
gered a schismatic religious revolution that undermined Catholic hegemony, 
changing religion in the world forever. I will briefly examine some aspects of 
this complex phenomenon, that is, Reformation in its Lutheran vein, which 
are relevant to dealing with James’s conception of religion: (1) Luther’s idea 
of grace, (2) Luther’s conceptions of justification by faith alone/justification 
by works, (3) Luther’s idea of salvation, (4) Luther’s idea of sola scriptura, and 
(5) Luther’s concept of church. From my perspective, these notions represent 
the core of Luther’s religious thought. __s
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 The first three conceptions are closely connected. Luther’s idea of grace 
turns around God’s mercy as a gift conferred on human beings independently 
of their works. Luther paradigmatically sustains this position in the following 
paragraph of The Good Works:
Look here! This is how you must cultivate Christ in yourself, and see 
how in him God holds before you his mercy and offers it to you without 
any prior merits of your own. It is from such a view of his grace that 
you must draw faith and confidence in the forgiveness of all your sins. 
Faith, therefore, does not originate in works; neither do works create 
faith, but faith must spring up and flow from the blood and wounds and 
death of Christ. (38; emphasis added)
 Furthermore, Luther maintains that we do not deserve this gift from 
God. So, as Alister McGrath writes: “[G]race is the ‘undeserved and unmer-
ited divine favour towards humanity’” (88). This is, as McGrath argues, a 
fundamental issue:
It is the idea of grace as the unmerited favour of God which underlies 
the doctrine of justification by faith, generally and rightly regarded as 
underlying the origins of the Lutheran Reformation in Germany. (89
 It is well known that the target of Luther’s attack was the sale of indul-
gences. An indulgence was a document that assured its possessor a remission 
of sins for himself or for a soul in Purgatory. First, Luther rebelled against 
the excess of indulgence sellers (mainly in 95 Theses). In subsequent books, 
however, Luther opposes the very idea of indulgences and questions the 
authority of the Catholic Church to sell or give indulgences (particularly 
in The Babylonian Captivity of the Church). By attacking indulgences and 
the authority of the Catholic Church, Luther insists on the idea that to be 
justified before God does not entail any good work on our part but only our 
belief in Him and His word. Thus, what matters is not our merits before a 
righteous God, but our faith.
 Grace and faith are related issues in Luther’s thought. While grace is 
a divine gift for humanity, it needs to be accepted by human beings. Such 
acceptance is what we call faith, which entails self-negation to give place to 
Christ:
Now if God is to live and to work in him, all this vice and wickedness 
must be choked and uprooted, so that in this event there is rest from of 
all our works, thoughts and life, so that henceforth (as St. Paul says in 
Galatians 2:20) it is no longer we who live, but Christ who lives, works 
and speaks in us. (Luther, Good Works 28)
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 This is a crucial issue regarding James’s conception of religion since it 
entails “relaxation” or “quietism” and not “action” as a central common topic 
between James and Luther. Then, it is from the combination of grace and 
faith that the idea of salvation emerges, that is, our salvation—the third as-
pect of Luther’s thought that I mention—depends on both the undeserved 
grace that God confers on us and our acceptance of such grace, that is, our 
faith in God and His word.
 The fourth and fifth issues focus on objective aspects of Luther’s thought. 
The former relates to the doctrine of sola scriptura. As it is well known, Lu-
ther attacked the authority of the Catholic Church and its system based on 
seven sacraments by simplifying it. For him, there were only two sacraments: 
baptism and communion. Such a simplification was based on the idea that 
the Holy Bible is the only authoritative source and that rituals added through 
different temporal processes are not important. Thesis 62 is an example of 
this conception: “The true treasure of the church is the most holy gospel of 
the glory and the grace of God” (Luther, 95 Theses 13).
 The last issue that I will refer to is Luther’s idea of Church, which is one 
of the most complex concepts within his thought. The question that arises is 
what the nature of a church is. Luther faced two options: either to sustain that 
there exists a visible church connected with the apostolic past—which poses 
the problem of differentiating such a church from the Catholic Church—on 
the one hand, or to hold that actual church is only in Heaven, on the other 
hand—which brings the problem of differentiating between such a church 
and the radical wing of Protestantism. Underlying the problem of the nature 
of the church is the relationship between the church and the Bible. Put dif-
ferently, why do we need a church if we have the Bible? I will refer to these 
features below.
 It has often been said that Luther’s thought entails paradoxical claims. 
Features (1)–(3) mentioned above, for example, mainly refer to one aspect of 
Luther’s thought, namely the foundation of religion in individual conscious-
ness through the appeal to grace and faith. On the other hand, features (4)–(5) 
make reference to another aspect of Luther’s thought, which is its foundation 
in the objective source of the Bible and the church. Put differently, (1)–(3) 
refer mainly to inward conviction as the source par excellence of religion, 
while (4)–(5) focus on sources that are independent of individuals. How can 
Luther’s thought be understood in this context?
 One option is to distinguish between the young and the mature Luther, 
as Gerhard Ebeling and Ginzo Fernández, among others, did.11 While the 
young Luther is mainly associated with the 95 Theses of Wittenberg (and 
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the books and pamphlets written until 1525) and regarded as a champion 
of the liberty of consciousness, the mature Luther is seen as the originator 
of a new orthodoxy. A clear example of young Luther’s conceptions can be 
found in To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation:
Besides, if we are all priests, as we said above, and all have one faith, one 
gospel, one sacrament, why should we not also have the power to test 
and judge what is right or wrong in matters of faith? What becomes of 
Paul’s words in I Corinthians 2:15: “A spiritual man judges all things, yet 
he is judged by no one”; and II Corinthians 4:13: “we all have one spirit 
of faith.” Why, then, should not we perceive what is consistent with 
faith and what is not, just as well as an unbelieving pope does?” (135)
 Despite the medieval framework of Luther’s thought, he has written para-
graphs like this, where a new idea of liberty is at stake. This is the kind of source 
that philosophical receptions of Luther—particularly Hegel—refer to. In other 
words, the philosophical course of Lutheranism relates mainly to subjectivism 
as its central feature, which considers our experience of God to be the funda-
mental aspect of religion to the extent that we are guided by the spirit.12
 Meanwhile, an example of the second position can be found in Luther’s 
Catechism. There, he insists that plain people should learn not through 
scriptures but through some simple means such as the Creed:
In the first place let the preacher above all be careful to avoid many kinds 
of or various texts and forms of the Ten Commandments, the Lord’s 
Prayer, the Creed, the Sacraments, etc., but choose one form to which 
he adheres, and which he inculcates all the time, year after year. For [I 
give this advice, however, because I know that] young and simple people 
must be taught by uniform, settled texts and forms, otherwise they eas-
ily become confused when the teacher to-day teaches them thus, and 
in a year some other way, as if he wished to make improvements, and 
thus all effort and labor [which has been expended in teaching] is lost.
 Also our blessed fathers understood this well; for they all used the 
same form of the Lord’s Prayer, the Creed, and the Ten Commandments. 
Therefore we, too, should [imitate their diligence and be at pains to] 
teach the young and simple people these parts in such a way as not to 
change a syllable, or set them forth and repeat them one year differ-
ently than in another [no matter how often we teach the Catechism]. 
(Luther, Small Catechism 313)
 To put it differently, Luther’s conception of religion can be interpreted 
as being divided into two veins: subjectivist and objectivist. In the former, s__
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the sola fides principle tends to prevail, while in the latter, the sola scriptura 
principle—or, paradoxically, the authority of the Lutheran Church—is the 
prevailing one. While philosophical views tend to emphasize the subjectiv-
ist aspect of Luther’s thought, theological orthodoxy relies on the principle 
of sola scriptura, minimizing the scope of the principle of sola fides. Thus, 
Luther’s duality explains the diverse receptions of his work: from the Bibli-
cism of the theological orthodoxy of the sixteenth century through the sev-
enteenth century to the philosophical recreations of Schleiermacher, Hegel, 
and Schopenhauer.
 This is a fundamental issue regarding the reception of Luther’s thought. 
For philosophical receptions of Luther (particularly Hegel’s), the fundamental 
aspect is represented by the principle of sola fides (and the individual’s liberty 
for individuals that this entails), but they have the problem to integrate this 
principle with the “objectivist” dimension of Luther’s thought: the concep-
tions of sola scriptura and of church. Meanwhile, the theological receptions 
of Luther have the opposite problem, that is, how to coherently relate the 
sola scriptura principle with the spiritualist domain of the principle of sola 
fides.
 Within this framework, I will mainly refer to the principle of sola fides, 
since it is fundamental to the various philosophical receptions of Luther’s 
thought. Regarding James, I take two essential ideas: self-surrender (one of 
the expressions more frequently used in Varieties), and the idea of the split 
between moral and religious experiences. In Luther’s thought, the latter idea 
is clearly expressed in his distinction between justification through works 
and justification through faith. In other words, for Luther, doing a morally 
right act means nothing without faith. Faith comes first as God’s gift, and as 
a consequence of having faith, we act correctly. Thus, there is, in my view, 
a clear distinction between religious experience and moral experience, since 
the latter presupposes the former.
 One aspect of the named tension, which should be highlighted, relates 
to the modernity of Luther’s thought: Does he set the outset of the modern 
era? Does his conception of religion belong to an authoritarian and ecclesias-
tical culture? (Troeltsch, Protestantism and Progress 10). The point I would 
like to emphasize is that there are grains of Luther’s thought that could be 
interpreted as the seeds of modern and contemporary ideas. In the frame 
of this article, and having in mind James’s conception of religion, I follow 
Troeltsch’s insight of Protestantism and Progress, specifically his notion of 
Luther’s “miracle of the idea.” __s
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He needed for the personal life something purely personal. The means 
was therefore faith, sola fides, the affirmation, by the complete surrender 
of the soul to it, of that thought of God which has been made clear and 
intelligible to us in Christ. (192)
 Troeltsch’s conception is relevant to my paper for two reasons: first, he 
highlights as its most relevant feature the subjectivist element of Luther’s 
thought; second, this subjectivist element can conduct us from Luther to 
James, that is, one can appreciate James’s role in the reception of Luther’s 
thought, as I will show below.
II. Luther at the Core of Varieties
James’s conception of religion has several characteristics: first, its defense of 
the individual right to believe despite living in a time of secularization and 
growing atheism, particularly in academic circles; second, a pluralistic view 
on religion that involves the divine we believe in is based on our inclinations 
and preferences; third, like his contemporary Durkheim, James has drawn a 
kind of distinction between the sacred and the profane.13
 Two aspects regarding what I call James’s Lutheranism are of the utmost 
significance: first, the relevance of linking institutional and conceptual Lu-
theranism within James’s thought; second, the direct influence of Luther’s 
work on James’s conception of religion. The first one will be considered in 
the next section. Thus, I will refer now to the influence of Luther on James’s 
thought, specifically in Varieties.14
 To put it directly, my hypothesis is that James’s Lutheranism has two 
aspects: first, his clear distinction between morality and religion; and second, 
his distinction between faith and the content of faith.15 Regarding the first 
aspect, it can be unambiguously found in some passages of Varieties, for ex-
ample, when James writes:
And here religion comes to our rescue and takes our fate into her hands. 
There is a state of mind, known to religious men, but to no others, in 
which the will to assert ourselves and hold our own has been displaced 
by a willingness to close our mouths and be as nothing in the floods and 
waterspouts of God. In this state of mind, what we most dreaded has 
become the habitation of our safety, and the hour of our moral death 
has turned into our spiritual birthday. (Varieties 46)
In this paragraph, James sharply distinguishes between religion and morals. 
But there is yet another element, namely that James’s conception focuses not 
only on the idea that religion shows us a dimension that morality cannot 
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reach, but also on religious experiences as being sometimes the result of an 
anti-moralistic method:
Under these circumstances the way to success, as vouched for by innu-
merable authentic personal narrations, is by an anti-moralistic method, 
by the “surrender” of which I spoke in my second lecture. Passivity, not 
activity; relaxation, not intentness, should be now the rule. (Varieties 95; 
emphasis added)
 Two Jamesian elements can be pointed out in the previous paragraph: 
first, that morality never cures as religion does. In other words: even the best 
suffer for their weakness, and their vitality is like a shadow destined to die; 
second, that sometimes passivity—and not activity—is the key to solving 
our spiritual problems.
 For my purposes, one point to highlight is that this passivity or quietism 
is explicitly connected with Luther’s view on religion:
On the whole, one is struck by a psychological similarity between the 
mind-cure movement and the Lutheran and Wesleyan movements. To 
the believer in moralism and works, with his anxious query, “What 
shall I do to be saved?” Luther and Wesley replied: “You are saved now, 
if you would but believe it.” (Varieties 94)
 The scope of quietism has often been discussed in the literature about 
Luther and Lutheranism.16 In other words, has Luther promulgated a religion 
based only on an individual that “surrenders”? Regarding the individual’s 
role, is it active only to the extent that he affirms or negates the call of grace? 
Different answers can be given to those questions. Usually, some courses of 
Lutheranism attempt to overcome the interpretation that attributes quietism 
to Luther’s conception of religion, whose central exponent is Ernst Troeltsch. 
In terms of the German author:
[I]t does not become really intelligible until we see that his basic idea 
is that of grace as the gift of God, which objectively precedes and im-
plies everything else, and that this divine grace is only obscured by 
human effort. Thus this stress upon free grace and human impotence 
leads Luther into an emphasis upon spiritual freedom and abandon-
ment, which merges almost imperceptibly in a kind of Quietism. (Social 
Teaching 497)
 Like Troeltsch, I think that Luther’s conception of grace leads us to 
quietism. For my purposes, however, this is a marginal issue. The relevant 
focuses are two: first, that James interprets Luther à la Troeltsch, that is, 
attributing quietism to his conception of religion; second, that James uses 
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this interpretation to ground his own view on religion. To understand both 
focuses, it is necessary to introduce some core issues of Varieties.
 It is well known that three types of religious mentalities are presented 
in Varieties: the healthy, the sick soul, and the twice-born. Though radically 
different, these mentalities share a feature: they are intelligible only in terms 
of faith (or through justification by faith) and not of justification by works 
(in Lutheran terms).
 For James, healthy souls are those that cannot perceive evil in the world. 
Moreover, in extreme cases, “in some individuals optimism may become 
quasi-pathological” (Varieties 75). What relationship does this bear with Lu-
theranism? They are not linked at a doctrinal level but through justification 
by faith, the mechanism proposed by Luther as fundamental. Put differently, 
the core of this mechanism is not action but our acceptance of God’s grace. 
In James’s terms: “It is but giving your little private convulsive self a rest, and 
finding that a greater Self is there” (Varieties 96). This giving up is overtly 
associated with Lutheran theology:
Give up the feeling of responsibility, let go your hold, resign the care 
of your destiny to higher powers, be genuinely indifferent as to what 
becomes of it all, and you will find not only that you gain a perfect 
inward relief, but often also, in addition, the particular goods you sin-
cerely thought you were renouncing. This is the salvation through self-
despair, the dying to be truly born, of Lutheran theology, the passage 
into nothing of which Jacob Behmen writes. (Varieties 96)
 Despite James’s criticism of the shortcoming of healthy souls—which I 
will refer to below—they show us central features of human nature, that is, 
that one needs at least a dose of healthy character for survival. Moreover, in 
their religious aspect, these souls are fundamental in order to help us grasp 
the essence of religion, namely the faith-state, in James’s words. He describes 
these features as follows:
The systematic cultivation of healthy-mindedness as a religious atti-
tude is therefore consonant with important currents in human nature, 
and is anything but absurd. In fact, we all do cultivate it more or less, 
even when our professed theology should in consistency forbid it. We 
divert our attention from disease and death as much as we can; and 
the slaughter-houses and indecencies without end on which our life 
is founded are huddled out of sight and never mentioned, so that the 
world we recognize officially in literature and in society is a poetic fic-
tion far handsomer and cleaner and better than the world that really 
is. (Varieties 80)
s__
n__
l__
lc
Pluralist 10_1 text.indd   90 11/4/14   3:00 PM
viale : Luther as Religious Genius 91
 This mentality is of fundamental importance for my argument, as it 
shows us one crucial issue: what is at stake is not the content of religious 
doctrines but the mechanism that allows religious experience to rise. This 
mechanism is based on the anti-moralistic, Lutheran method of the surrender 
of the self, which is exemplified in the following paragraph:
Martin Luther by no means belonged to the healthy-minded type in the 
radical sense in which we have discussed it, and he repudiated priestly 
absolution for sin. Yet in this matter of repentance he had some very 
healthy-minded ideas, due in the main to the largeness of his concep-
tion of God. (Varieties 110)
 In other words, Luther’s healthy mind does not relate to the doctrinaire 
level, but to his idea as to how the relationship between the individual and 
God works, that is, through the method of self-surrender. This necessarily 
entails the split between religious and moral experience, since the latter is 
grounded on the former.
 Sick souls, on the other hand, perceive only evil in the world, a percep-
tion which is acutely felt, as pointed out by James:
Not the conception or intellectual perception of evil, but the grisly 
blood-freezing heart-palsying sensation of it close upon one, and no 
other conception or sensation able to live for a moment in its presence. 
(Varieties 135)
 James sustains that this variety of religious experience is richer than 
the first one, in the sense that it allows us to comprehend more features of 
the world. Not only is this mentality presented as compatible with Luther’s 
thought, but it is described by James by quoting Luther. Regarding the ac-
tuality of pessimism, the essential mark of this mentality, James writes:
The completest religions would therefore seem to be those in which 
the pessimistic elements are best developed. Buddhism, of course, and 
Christianity are the best known to us of these. They are essentially re-
ligions of deliverance: the man must die to an unreal life before he can 
be born into the real life. (Varieties 138)
 But more specifically, James maintains that Protestant theology perfectly 
fits this kind of religious temperament:
It is needless to remind you once more of the admirable congruity of 
Protestant theology with the structure of the mind as shown in such ex-
periences. In the extreme of melancholy the self that consciously is can do 
absolutely nothing. It is completely bankrupt and without resource, and 
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no works it can accomplish will avail. Redemption from such subjective 
conditions must be a free gift or nothing, and grace through Christ’s ac-
complished sacrifice is such a gift. (Varieties 198–99)
 After this statement relating Protestant theology to sick souls, James 
quotes a long paragraph from Luther’s Commentary on the Galatians, and 
he concludes with the following words:
That is, the more literally lost you are, the more literally you are the very 
being whom Christ’s sacrifice has already saved. Nothing in Catholic 
theology, I imagine, has ever spoken to sick souls as straight as this mes-
sage from Luther’s personal experience. (Varieties 199–200)
 From a theological perspective, the message in this paragraph is of re-
markable importance. However, what I want to stress is not a theological but 
a methodological issue, namely that James shows us once more that religious 
experiences are grounded on an anti-moralistic method, that is, giving up of 
the self and trust in the divinity.
 The last mentality presented by James in the Varieties is the twice-born. 
It is the most complete of all religious souls because they have seen both good 
and evil, that is, both sides of the abysm, and they have recovered through a 
process that James calls redemption:
The process is one of redemption, not of mere reversion to natural 
health, and the sufferer, when saved, is saved by what seems to him 
a second birth, a deeper kind of conscious being than he could enjoy 
before. (Varieties 131)
 When James deals with these souls, he does not recur to Luther’s works. 
However, from a logical point of view, he uses the same anti-moralistic Lu-
theran method to explain the way these souls should be conceived of:
It may come gradually, or it may occur abruptly; it may come through 
altered feelings or through altered powers of action; or it may come 
through new intellectual insights, or through experiences which we 
shall later have to designate as ‘mystical.’ However it comes, it brings a 
characteristic sort of relief; and never such extreme relief as when it is 
cast into the religious mould. Happiness! Happiness! Religion is only 
one of the ways in which men gain that gift. Easily, permanently, and 
successfully, it often transforms the most intolerable misery into the 
profoundest and most enduring happiness. (Varieties 146)
 Thus, for twice-born as well as for healthy and sick souls, the most im-
portant feature is their ability to find a vital sense putting themselves aside 
and resting on a greater Self.
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 I have just depicted the main features of James’s religious mentalities 
and have shown how they share a crucial aspect, namely the split between 
morality and religion. But these mentalities share another essential feature: 
passivity. How does this explain the strenuousness that James sometimes 
attributes to moral agents and religious geniuses? I think that the analogy 
with Luther’s view is enlightening. I have said above that, for Luther, moral 
experiences depend on basic and previous religious experiences. It is the same 
for James. There exists a religious passivity that could give way to strenuous 
moral actions. But passivity emerges first and, in James, by the anti-moralistic 
method of self-surrender. In other words: it is not through good works that 
one reaches God (or salvation) but through faith, and this can be the origin 
of a strenuous and fertile moral life.17
 All religious experience is therefore radically different from moral ex-
perience. I have called this “James’s Lutheranism” because the American 
philosopher grounded this conception on Luther’s thought, particularly in a 
methodological way: the method of the surrender of the self.
 Regarding belief and faith, James takes another fundamental step in 
Varieties, that is, he openly separates the intellectual content of faith from 
having faith. Unsurprisingly, James recurs to Luther to ground his position:
Faith that Christ has genuinely done his work was part of what Luther 
meant by faith, which so far is faith in a fact intellectually conceived of. 
But this is only a part of Luther’s faith, the other part being far more 
vital. This other part is something not intellectual but immediate and 
intuitive, the assurance, namely that I, this individual I, just as I stand, 
without one plea, etc., am saved now and forever. (Varieties 200)
 Faith has two connotations within James’s work. In his melioristic ac-
count of religion, he conceives an active faith, that is, an energetic faith that 
helps to produce the desired object. This is crystal clear in The Will to Be-
lieve. However, in the mystical approach that I am taking in this paper, faith 
means something different, that is, to put aside ourselves and our supposed 
good and natural self-sufficiency to give place to the divinity. In other words, 
this is a faith related to the idea of self-surrender.
 Meanwhile, Luther’s conception of religion focuses—through the prin-
ciple of sola fides—on individual experience as a primordial source of reli-
gion, but it conserves a very restrictive way to conceive the content of this 
experience through the principle of sola scriptura and the authority of the 
church. On the other hand, James distinguishes between faith and the con-
tent of faith. This step is central since it allows setting the core of religious 
experience within the individual. James’s Lutheranism consists in taking one 
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of Luther’s basic insights, namely the fact of believing that one is saved as a 
fundamental ground of religion, putting aside doctrines and rites.
III. In the Philosophical Path  
of Lutheranism: James on Religion
Lutheranism unambiguously marked the development of Western philoso-
phy, particularly in Germany. From Leibniz, Kant, and Schleiermacher to 
Feuerbach, Marx and Nietzsche, all German philosophy reacted to the work 
of the great reformer. As philosophical courses of Lutheranism, German 
philosophers refer mainly to the Lutheran principle of sola fides. One point 
to stress is how they reacted to Lutheranism, either by professing or reject-
ing it. I will leave aside those philosophers who rejected Lutheranism—the 
most radical being Marx and Nietzsche—and will briefly examine the phi-
losopher who paradigmatically took the project of Lutheranism as his own: 
Hegel. One of the essential features of Hegelian philosophy is its emphasis 
on inwardness as a constitutive element of religion. For Hegel, Luther as well 
as Germany accurately understood the essence of the message, and therefore 
they considered inwardness to be the core of Christianity. In Hegel’s words:
The time-honored and cherished sincerity of the German people is 
destined to effect this revolution out the honest truth and simplicity 
of its heart. While the rest of the world are urging their way to India, 
to America . . . we find a simple Monk [Luther] looking for that spe-
cific embodiment of Deity which Christendom had formerly sought 
in an earthly sepulcher of stone, rather in the deeper abyss of the Abso-
lute Ideality of all that is sensuous and external—in the Spirit and the 
Heart—the heart. (Philosophy of History 518–19)18
 Consequently, a central feature of Hegel’s appropriation of Luther’s 
thought is his remark on the pre-eminence of inwardness and the principle 
of sola fides. But Hegel was a Lutheran who, in spite of firmly opposing the 
principle of sola scriptura and orthodox theology, defended the authority of 
the Lutheran Church. In his Philosophy of History, for example, he sustains 
that the Kingdom of the Spirit starts with Reformation and, more relevant to 
my purposes, that the Lutheran Church has the mission to instill universality 
and freedom into the world. Moreover, Hegel maintains that liberty and the 
Lutheran Church are two sides of the same coin:
[B]ut the heart—the emotional part of man’s Spiritual nature—is rec-
ognized as that which can and ought to come into possession of the 
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Truth; and this subjectivity is the common property of all mankind. 
Each has to accomplish the work of reconciliation in his own soul. . . . 
Thus that absolute inwardness of soul which pertains to religion itself, 
and Freedom in the Church are both secured. Subjectivity therefore 
makes the objective purport of Christianity, i.e. the doctrine of the 
Church, its own. (Philosophy of History 520)
 The colossal magnitude of Hegel’s philosophical project can be inter-
preted as an attempt to close the cycle that Luther had opened when un-
dermining the authority of the Catholic Church. However, the vertiginous 
course of post-Hegelian European philosophy illustrates the great difficulties 
that such a program had: Lutheranism started to disintegrate, among other 
reasons, between Nietzsche’s sharp darts and Kierkegaard’s existentialism. 
Particularly Kierkegaard prefigures the destiny of Lutheranism in James’s 
conception of religion.19 Thus, Hegel’s endeavor to reconcile inwardness 
and the sola fides principle with the necessary universal authority of the 
Lutheran Church fails. However, his unrivaled portrait of Luther’s pro-
found transformation of religion remains, that is, the rejection of external 
authority and the subsequent primacy of individuals through the principle 
of sola fides and inwardness. Then, Hegel’s best legacy is his conception of 
Luther as a religious genius.
 Meanwhile, in America, the relationship between philosophy and religion 
followed a very different trail. Protestantism had been essentially Calvinist 
since Colonial times. Within this context, American Lutheranism had an 
unimportant philosophical impact and produced very limited theological 
developments, as sustained by the contemporary Lutheran theologian Martin 
Marty.20
 In America, then, philosophy arises mainly from the reception of com-
monsense Scottish realism (Emerson being perhaps the most notable excep-
tion). Scottish realism was also changing its face to the extent that science (es-
pecially Darwinism) was undermining the theoretical framework of a biblical 
culture. It was within this context that James wrote on religion. In America 
and Germany, therefore, very different paths were followed that resulted in 
the marriage between Protestantism and philosophy: while the former con-
sisted of a philosophical realism tied to Calvinism, the latter was an idealistic 
project grounded on the universal mission that Lutheranism had.21
 Accordingly, within the American cultural scene, Scottish realism, Dar-
winism, and liberal theology formed the context where James’s philosophy 
developed.22 Some interpreters infer that James’s philosophical (and religious) 
views were shaped by them. However, to understand James’s conception of 
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religion as endorsing a kind of liberal theology is, in my view, deeply mis-
taken.23 One of the main targets of James’s attack was the so-called liberal 
Christianity or liberal Protestantism:
The advance of liberalism, so-called, in Christianity, during the past fifty 
years, may fairly be called a victory of healthy-mindedness within the 
church over the morbidness with which the old hell-fire theology was 
more harmoniously related. We have now whole congregations whose 
preachers, far from magnifying our consciousness of sin, seem devoted 
rather to making little of it. They ignore, or even deny, eternal punish-
ment, and insist on the dignity rather than on the depravity of man. 
They look at the continual preoccupation of the old-fashioned Chris-
tian with the salvation of his soul as something sickly and reprehensible 
rather than admirable; and a sanguine and “muscular” attitude, which 
to our forefathers would have seemed purely heathen, has become in 
their eyes an ideal element of Christian character. (Varieties 91)
 Although, in the previous paragraph, James is not judging but only de-
scribing the situation of Protestantism, he is very critical of the idea of religion 
being absorbed into morality, that is, he does not agree with the Pelagian 
ethos that Protestantism had within the second part of the nineteenth century 
because it does not take account of the morbid side of religious experiences.
 Meanwhile, Darwinism—which is another source usually mentioned 
by James—is useless within this context because science and religion address 
dissimilar human needs (see note 13). Finally, Scottish realism (the last con-
stituent of the cultural scene in nineteenth-century America that I will refer 
to) is worthless to understand sick souls, and it was early rejected by James 
because of its atomism.24
 Within this common framework, I think there is an insightful way to 
grasp James’s conception of religion from a different perspective. In other 
words, despite the enduring attacks carried out by James against Hegel (and 
Hegelianism), they share a fundamental view: Luther is a religious genius 
who has transformed our conception of what a religious experience is, on 
the one hand; and this transformation is grounded on the idea of inwardness 
and the principle of sola fides, on the other hand.
 Consequently, what I call Hegel’s best legacy—to conceive Lutheran re-
ligion as accurately finding the essence of Christianity in interiority—finds 
its highest radicalism in James’s view on religion, since both depict Luther 
as the most important modern religious genius. James is as explicit as Hegel 
concerning this issue:s__
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Just as romantic love seems a comparatively recent literary invention, 
so these experiences seem to have played no great part before Luther’s 
time; and the best way to indicate their character will possibly be to draw 
a contrast between the inner life of ourselves and of the ancient Greeks 
and Romans.” (“Reason and Faith” 200; emphasis added)25
 From the essential words of this paragraph, that is, the inner life of 
ourselves, it can be inferred that James thinks of modern individuals—like 
himself—as following the path opened by Luther. Within this course, Hegel 
was halfway between sola fides and the authority of the Lutheran Church. 
James, on the other hand, unfolds the decisive consummation of Luther’s 
individualism:
The pivot round which the religious life, as we have traced it, revolves, 
is the interest of the individual in his private personal destiny. Religion, 
in short, is a monumental chapter in the history of human egotism. 
The gods believed in—whether by crude savages or by men disciplined 
intellectually—agree with each other in recognizing personal calls. Re-
ligious thought is carried on in terms of personality, this being, in the 
world of religion, the one fundamental fact. Today, quite as much as at 
any previous age, the religious individual tells you that the divine meets 
him on the basis of his personal concerns. (Varieties 491)
 However, Luther’s religious genius consists not only in giving rise to the 
individualization of religion but—as insightfully pointed out by James—in 
describing a very particular kind of religious experience:
Luther was the first moralist who broke with any effectiveness through 
the crust of all this naturalistic self-sufficiency, thinking (and possibly 
he was right) that Saint Paul had done it already. Religious experience 
of the Lutheran type brings all our naturalistic standards to bankruptcy. 
You are strong only by being weak, it shows. (Pluralistic Universe 137)
 Looking at Varieties through this paragraph of A Pluralistic Universe, 
one can grasp Luther’s awesome relevance to focus on a fundamental cur-
rent nucleus of religion: the morbid side of existence that James calls “the 
sick souls.” This invention—in terms of James—not only makes Luther our 
contemporary, but it allows us to infer that he is not only a common religious 
genius, that is, a religious genius as George Fox, St. Teresa, or St. Ignatius 
Loyola. In other words, Luther is a religious genius who originated the con-
temporary way to conceive religion, for two reasons: on the one hand, he was 
the first to buck the naturalistic trend in religion; on the other hand, since __s
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Luther’s life and work, we have had a radically new approach to religious 
experiences, that is, we have to take sick souls seriously.
 Summing up, religious inwardness shows us a philosophical course that 
can be drawn from Luther to Hegel and James. Hegel, however, is still trapped 
in the Lutheran—universalist—conception of church, while James puts aside 
rituals and doctrines as central elements of religion and focuses on feelings, 
acts, and experiences. This Jamesian move let us conceive contemporary creeds 
as contingent expressions of religious experiences and, for this reason, more 
suitable for pluralistic societies.
 Thus, if we conceive the sola fides principle as the fundamental legacy 
of Lutheranism, James could be interpreted as a Lutheran who gave the coup 
de grâce to the last objective remains of orthodox Lutheranism: the universal 
authority of the Church. This could be seen as a decisive step in the history 
of philosophical receptions of Lutheranism. Consequently, James asserts a 
distilled Lutheranism coherently grounded only on the principle of sola fides 
without any connection with the objective aspect of Luther’s thought, that 
is, by taking seriously the role of the individual before the divinity, James 
becomes one of the most radical representatives of the Lutheran principle of 
sola fides. If one examines philosophical receptions of Luther, the Jamesian 
is one of the first to really leave the individual alone before the divinity, that 
is, to explicitly avoid any kind of necessary mediation. In James’s words:
[T]he individual transacts the business by himself alone, and the eccle-
siastical organization, with its priests and sacraments and other go-
betweens, sinks to an altogether secondary place. The relation goes 
direct from heart to heart, from soul to soul, between man and his 
maker. (Varieties 29)
Conclusion
Not only did Luther’s conception of religion change religious thought forever, 
but it also had an enormous impact on Western philosophy.26 For philoso-
phy, this Lutheran impact is centrally owed to the principle of sola fides, as 
I have attempted to show. German philosophy, particularly, is impossible to 
understand without a Lutheran background. However, I think it was not in 
Germany but in America where the philosophical course of Lutheranism 
reached its maximal radicalism and coherence. It was William James who, 
putting aside doctrines and rites as the elementary forms of religion, estab-
lished the central importance of the principle of sola fides.
 In the present article, I have defended three theses about James’s concep-
tion of religion: first, that it was markedly influenced by Luther’s thought; 
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second, that it presents a dual Lutheranism (split between religion and moral-
ity grounded on the method of self-surrender/distinction between the con-
tent of faith and having faith); and third, that it represents one of the most 
radical interpretations of Luther’s thought, that is, the primacy of Luther’s 
conception of faith against his idea of church and sola scriptura.
 These theses have a different scope. If I am right about the first one, we 
should consider what consequences James’s dual Lutheranism implies: the 
split between religion and morality is nothing but to give a new form to the 
principle of the great reformer, and only faith and grace capture the essence 
of religion. Meanwhile, the distinction between faith and the content of 
faith gives James’s Lutheranism its particularity, namely the radicalization of 
Luther’s best intuition that only faith captures the essence of religion, while 
disregarding its articulation in creeds as only a contingent aspect. This is 
the cardinal importance of James if we consider his work as a philosophical 
course of Lutheranism. In other words, the distinction between faith and the 
content of faith implies the definitive victory of the principle of sola fides 
against the principle of sola scriptura. Thus, through James’s work, the nails 
of Wittenberg reverberate in the streets of New England.
notes
I finished this paper during my visit to the Department of Philosophy at Texas A&M 
University (College Station) (December 2013–March 2014) where I was supported 
with a fellowship from CONICET (Argentina). I thank my host, Gregory Pappas, and 
especially Professor John McDermott for useful discussion on the draft of this article. 
The language was revised by Rita Karina Plasencia.
 1. Quoted in Hockenbery Dragseth v.
 2. I do not attempt to deal here with James’s own religious experiences and needs. My 
purpose is to examine James’s Varieties from a conceptual point of view and to establish 
its connections with Luther and Lutheranism.
 3. James explicitly identifies himself with Protestant traditions in several works. In The 
Will to Believe (16), for example, he says:
It is evident that unless there be some pre-existing tendency to believe in masses 
and holy water, the opinion offered to the will by Pascal is not a living option. Cer-
tainly, no Turk ever took to masses and holy water on its account; and even to us 
Protestants these means of salvation seem such foregone impossibilities that Pascal’s 
logic, invoked for them specifically, leaves us unmoved.
See also Varieties 265.
 4. In Hollinger’s words:
Such cases “in the annals of Catholic saintship,” he [James] says explicitly, “make us 
rub our Protestant eyes.” There is no question who the “we” or the “us” is whenever 
James invokes these portentous pronouns. What casts James’s treatment of Fox and 
other canonical Protestants into bold relief, then, is not so much his fleeting use of 
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Muslim and Jewish cases but the sustained treatment he gives to Catholics. One 
can easily get the impression that Varieties is a non-individual harvest of the most 
intense spiritual moments of all the major religions, especially of Christianity, em-
bracing Catholic as well as Protestant variations. But no. Varieties is constructed to 
foreground certain religious sensibilities and not others, and to present the core of 
religion in general as having been most attractively manifest in exactly the cultural 
tradition to which James’s listeners and readers were directly heir. (13)
 5. Ralph Barton Perry (257), for example, writes: “But while James identifies religion 
with certain specific experiences revealed, he did not identify religion with any particular 
creed.” A similar interpretation can be found in Levinson (21).
 6. This is the interpretation of some important scholars, too. Hollinger (11), for ex-
ample, sustains that:
James’s ostensibly species-wide account of religious experience is deeply Protestant 
in structure, tone, and implicit theology. Even the categories of religious experience 
around which Varieties is organized, and the order in which James describes them, 
have this quality. As theologian Reinhold Niebuhr and others have pointed out, 
James, by moving from “healthy-mindedness” to the “sick soul” to the “divided 
self ” to “conversion” and then to “saintliness,” follows the prescribed sequence of 
the evangelical Protestant conversion narratives.
 Meanwhile, Julius Rubin (18) points out the Protestant features of James’s religious 
thought: “Although ostensibly a general work on religion, James’s essays actually ex-
plored Protestantism, in particular, the forms of religious experience found within early 
nineteenth-century New Englander spiritual biographies.”
 7. Also Gale (256) and Myers (472) sustain that the core of Varieties rests on the no-
tion of self-surrender.
 8. Other paragraphs of Spohn’s article show his deep understanding of James’s concep-
tion of religion: “James interpreted his experience of depression and deliverance in this 
pattern, even though it evoked a faith that was not necessarily Christian. He acknowledged 
that Protestant theology, particularly Luther’s, has ‘admirable congruity’ with his account 
of the transformation of ‘the sick soul’” (37). Moreover, Spohn stresses (33) the centrality 
of Christianity for James’s thought: “The central symbol of the Christian tradition, the 
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, as interpreted through Evangelical Christianity, 
lurks behind the language of a theory that claims to transcend traditional symbols and 
doctrines.” Finally, Spohn identifies (33) a key element underlying James’s approach to 
religion: “However anonymously, James stands within the tradition of Augustinian piety 
that dominates American religion.”
 9. Hinlicky (25) writes:
Another, more specific clue to the theological dead-end to which the method of 
“enthusiasm” comes is the schizophrenic treatment accorded to Luther in Variet-
ies. Luther appears in these pages as an example of healthy “mind cure” (Varieties 
107–08). But this supposed mile marker on modern culture’s road to religious 
inwardness could also be classified with the sick soul’s crisis of “self-surrender” (Va-
rieties 211), as James describes the sick old man Luther who “looked back on life 
as if it were an absolute failure” (Varieties 137).
 Although I disagree with Hinlicky’s view that James’s dealing with Luther in Varieties 
was schizophrenic, I acknowledge that he has insightfully remarked on Luther’s influ-
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ence on James’s thought. I really appreciate the anonymous reviewers’ observation that I 
should include Hinlicky’s book in my article.
 10. I am fully aware that there are several possible perspectives on James’s view of re-
ligion and that they depend on what one considers to be the core of his thought. Those 
forms have been labeled Prometheanism (McDermott, Introduction xix) and mysticism. 
The first is clearly exemplified in Richard Gale’s interpretation:
When James was in his healthy Promethean frame of mind he tingled all over at the 
thought that we are engaged in a Texas Death Match with evil, without any assurance 
of possibility of victory. This possibility forms the basis of his religion of meliorism. 
But there is a morbid side to James’s nature, a really morbid side, that “can’t get no 
satisfaction” from the sort of religion that his pragmatism legitimates. In order to 
“help him make it through the night” he needs a mystically based religion, which 
gives him a sense of absolute safety and peace that comes through union with an 
encompassing spiritual reality. (16)
 An opposing way to understand James’s conception of religion can be seen in Michael 
Slater (“Metaphysical Intimacy” 122):
The third and final criterion, moral helpfulness, denotes the values of a belief or expe-
rience for the moral life, and in the context of James’s studies of religious experience 
this may very well be the most important of the three. In particular, James thinks 
that it is the good dispositions (VRE 24–26) produced by religious and mystical 
experience which provide us with the best indicators of their truth, though such 
dispositions are valuable in their own right on moral grounds.
 Also, James’s Pragmatism (144) helps to support Slater’s interpretation. Two differ-
ent conceptions of faith are at stake here: James’s mystical aspect is grounded on a 
passive concept of faith; meanwhile, in his Promethean facet, faith is an active—or 
strenuous—human endeavor linked with morals. What role does Varieties play within 
James’s thought? I think there is a tension in the book between the melioristic and the 
mystical sides. The latter—essentially through the idea of self-surrender—is funda-
mental to what I conceive as the core of the book, that is, the description of the three 
religious mentalities. Meanwhile, the former side plays a central role in the conclusion 
through Leuba’s notion of use (Varieties 399). It could therefore be thought that in 
Varieties, the tension between the melioristic and mystical sides of James’s philosophy 
of religion finds its utmost expression. I ground my interpretation on the mystical side 
of James’s conception of religion.
 11. Gerhard Ebeling (21) has clearly drawn this distinction between theological or-
thodoxy and philosophical re-creations of Luther’s thought:
The period of Protestant orthodoxy modified the view of him [Luther] as a prophet, 
emphasizing more his restoration of pure doctrine. A section de vocatione Lutheri 
actually occurs as a part of dogmatic theology in some works of early Protestant 
orthodoxy. Pietism made a similar appeal to Luther, but it distinguished between Lu-
ther in his earlier and later years. A contrast was drawn between the period when he 
was supposed to have become embittered by his opposition to the enthusiastic sects 
and by disputes within Protestantism,—if not actually inclined to a certain extent 
to return to Catholicism—and the early period when the gospel of repentance and 
grace, still pure and close to the devotional literature of German mysticism which 
was so highly regarded by pietism, remained clearly visible. The Enlightenment 
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also saw Luther as its pattern and example, emphasizing the freedom of conscience 
which he had made possible. . . . [T]he dominant view, inspired by denominational 
and idealistic motives, regarded Luther as the forerunner of the modern period.
 12. Several philosophers have emphasized that the sola fides principle should prevail 
over the sola scriptura principle (Leibniz, Lessing, and Kant, among others). A detailed 
examination of this issue can be seen in Ginzo Fernández.
 13. I have written an article relating James and Durkheim: see Viale, “Sacred/Profane.”
 14. Although references to Luther are not important within The Correspondence of 
William James, and they are made mainly in an informal and not conceptual way, there 
is a letter to Leuba dated 1904 (396), where James writes the following:
Religious men largely agree that this sense has been that of their “best” moments, 
best not only when passing, but when looked back upon. The notion of it has leaked 
into mankind from their authority, the rest of us are imitative, just as we are of sci-
entific men’s opinions. We live by Luther’s just as we do by Newton’s suggestions, 
and find ourselves helped by both.
 I will argue, therefore, that James conceives of Luther as one of the most paradigmatic 
models of religious geniuses.
 15. Although I ground my argument on Varieties, it is important to highlight that as 
early as 1884, James entertains a clear distinction between morality and religion. Analyz-
ing, for example, The Literary Remains by Henry James, Sr., he endorses the following 
paragraph: “It shows the depth of Mr. James’s religious insight that he first and last and 
always made moralism the target of his hottest attack, and pitted religion and it against 
each other as enemies, of whom one must die utterly, if the other is to live in genuine 
form. The accord of moralism and religion is superficial, their discord radical” (James, Es-
says in Religion and Morality 62–63; emphasis added). James Pawelski (22) stresses this 
difference too:
James’s distinction between moralism and religion can be succinctly described as 
referring to two different ways individuals can accept the universe. James argues that, 
although both moralists and religionists have a finite place in the order of things, 
they respond to their finitude in different ways. Moralists accept it only because 
they must. Their muscles are tensed in struggle against the order of things. Reli-
gionists, on the other hand, accept, welcome, and even love the universe and their 
finite place in it. Moralists respond willfully: religionist, passionately. Paradoxically, 
however, the result of these responses is that moralists are on the defensive and find 
it harder to act in the world, whereas religionists are free to be aggressive in their 
active relations with the world.
 16. Reinhold Niebuhr (187–88), for example, has accused Luther of quietism: “Some-
times he lapses into mystical doctrines of passivity or combines quietism with a legalistic 
conception or the imputation of righteousness. ‘Without works’ degenerates into ‘without 
action’ in some of his strictures against the ‘righteousness of works.’” A critical analysis 
of this position can be seen in Brent W. Sockness.
 17. A paragraph by Douglas Anderson (9) could be interpreted in a similar way:
The self-surrender or submission, ironically, leads to a rebirth. The converted soul 
feels empowered in ways that she or he had not previously experienced. . . . [T]he 
difference from the free power and agency felt by the healthy-minded is that the 
personal power now has a clearly self-transcendent source: a living ideal or power. 
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The converted soul finds herself or himself living in a wider life where things can 
be seen more clearly.
 18. Hegel (519) follows: “Luther’s simple doctrine is that the specific embodiment of 
Deity—infinite subjectivity, that is true spirituality, Christ—is in no way present and 
actual in an outward form, but as essentially spiritual is obtained only in being reconciled 
to God—in faith and spiritual enjoyment.”
 19. I owe clarification of this point to Professor John McDermott.
 20. Marty (79) clearly states that action was more necessary than theoretical develop-
ment:
The Evangelical empire and the people in it needed guidance and interpretation. To 
think of this activity as “doing theology” seems confusing to many people. In their 
model, theology demands great minds. It is difficult to make a case for many reli-
gious geniuses on the American scene between Jonathan Edwards and Josiah Royce, 
William James, or Walter Rauschenbusch over a century later. Among the church-
men, perhaps Horace Bushnell alone is much read a century later. At the fringes 
of religious life an occasional spirit like Ralph Waldo Emerson attracted notice.
 21. Hegel’s reception in America (particularly among St. Louis Hegelians) pointed 
out the relevance of religion, but generally the Lutheran framework of the German phi-
losopher was disregarded. Concerning this issue, Henry Pochmann (26), for example, 
writes the following:
When the St. Louis Movement began, the difference between what Parker called 
the transient and the permanent in religion had not been so sharply drawn nor 
were they so clearly understood as they are today. The drawing of this distinction 
between religion itself on the one hand and the expression of religion in doctrines 
and rites, or the application of religion through institutions, on the other, is one of 
the great achievements of the nineteenth century.
 22. Bruce Kuklick (10) points out this link:
If we consider all American religious movements of the nineteenth century, the views 
of the numerically unimportant Unitarians were such that many Christians would 
not have considered them co-religionists. Nonetheless, both the Unitarians and the 
other denominations that spoke for the socioeconomic elites in various parts of the 
country found a theoretical rationale in the same philosophy: Scottish realism. This 
school of thought held great interest for those in American Protestantism who were 
concerned with philosophical problems of religion.
 23. This point was very clearly made by Barton Perry (259): “From James’s emphasis 
upon uniqueness of the religious experience, and its specific factual implications, arose his 
paradoxical relation to contemporary Christianity. Religion of the sort in which he was 
interested was closer to the simply piety of the evangelical sects than to that of modern 
religious liberalism.” However, to understand James’s conception of religion as belong-
ing to liberal Protestantism is a very common mistake within the literature. Examples 
of this misunderstanding can be found in the works of Hollinger; Porterfield (140–41); 
and Dorrien (224–25); among others.
 24. I also owe clarification of this point to Professor McDermott.
 25. This article was based on a William James’s conference: “In 1906, while lecturing 
at Leland Stanford, William James accepted an invitation to contribute to a discussion 
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of “Reason and Faith” at a dinner of the Pacific Coast Unitarian Club in San Francisco 
on February 5th. What follows is a summary of what he said which he himself prepared 
to be printed in the proceedings of the meeting” (Henry James, qtd. in William James, 
“Reason and Faith”).
 26. Particularly in Germany. Habermas said (68) that “philosophy in Germany lives 
so thoroughly out of the Protestant spirit that Catholics practically have to become Prot-
estant in order to do philosophy.”
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